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This article suggests that larger, better-governed, and lower ownership concentration 
companies have less homogeneous and passive boards, but pay more to their senior 
managers and directors. These companies probably need better-paid professionals to 
cope with more complex compliance and business environments. We create two 
categorical variables named homogeneity (HS) and passivity (PS) scores that aggregate 
hand collected board member characteristics. More homogeneous and passive boards 
may grant larger director and senior management compensations under the managerial 
power hypothesis (BEBCHUK and FRIED, 2005). On the other hand, larger and value 
increasing companies may pay more to their senior managers (JENSEN and MURPHY, 
1990). Our findings suggest that less homogeneous and passive boards grant larger 
compensations in univariate tests. These results, however, do not transpire in multivariate 
tests. More homogeneous and passive boards are more frequent in smaller and higher 
ownership concentration companies, with poorer corporate governance and disclosure 
practices. It is possible that financial disclosure practices are more important then board 
characteristics (LEAL and CARVALHAL-DA-SILVA, 2007). These results highlight the 
importance of disclosure and transparency efforts to improve investor relations and reduce 
the cost of capital in a high ownership concentration country.  
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Este artigo sugere que empresas maiores, com melhores práticas de governança 
corporativa e menor concentração de direitos de propriedade têm conselhos de 
administração (CA) menos homogêneos e passivos, mas pagam mais a sua diretoria e 
conselheiros. Essas empresas provavelmente precisam de profissionais mais bem pagos 
para lidar com ambientes de conformidade e de negócios mais complexos. Nós criamos 
duas variáveis categóricas chamadas de pontuações de homogeneidade e passividade 
que agregam dados colhidos a mão sobre características dos membros do CA. CAs mais 
homogêneos e passivos podem conceder maiores remunerações para a diretoria e 
conselheiros sob a hipótese do poder gerencial (BEBCHUK e FRIED, 2005). Por outro 
lado, grandes empresas que agregam valor para os acionistas podem pagar mais a sua 
diretoria (JENSEN e MURPHY, 1990). Nossos resultados sugerem que os CA menos 
homogêneos e passivos concedem remunerações maiores em testes univariados. Estes 
resultados, no entanto, não surgem nos testes multivariados. CAs mais homogêneos e 
passivos são mais frequentes em empresas menores, com maior concentração de direitos 
de propriedade e práticas de governança corporativa e divulgação de informações 
piores. É possível que as práticas de divulgação financeira sejam mais importantes do que 
as características dos conselheiros (LEAL e CARVALHAL-DA-SILVA, 2007). Estes resultados 
destacam a importância dos esforços de divulgação e transparência para melhorar as 
relações com investidores e reduzir o custo de capital em um país com concentração de 
direitos de propriedade elevada. 
Palavras-chave: características dos conselheiros, remuneração de executivos, governança 




1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Compensation is a critical board of directors (BOD) decision. Compensation 
packages may align the interests of senior managers and directors with those of minority 
shareholders, but they may also lead to conflicts and adhere little to performance 
(BEBCHUK and FRIED, 2005). This article uses a hand-collected database of Brazilian 
BOD member characteristics to investigate their association with senior management and 
BOD compensation levels. Two scores named BOD homogeneity and passivity collect 
individual BOD member characteristics because they may substitute for one another as 
potential indicators of BOD effectiveness. BOD member characteristics include their age, 
gender, academic background, time availability proxies, committee participation, and 
independence.  
The contribution of this article is to verify if individual director characteristics matter 
in a high ownership concentration country where powerful shareholders nominate most 
directors. Ownership concentration is very high in Brazil and previous research concluded 
that it is negatively associated with compensation levels, lending some support to the 
managerial power hypothesis (PINTO and LEAL, 2013; BEBCHUK and FRIED, 2005). 
However, the identity of ultimate major shareholders also matters. Pinto and Leal (2013) 
assert that senior management and BOD average and dispersion of individual 
compensation increase when controlling family members hold BOD seats, with family 
directors and senior managers earning a much higher pay than others. Institutional 
investors as relevant shareholders (more than 5% of equity interest), on the other hand, 
may be associated to lower levels of compensation. This may be, in part, because the 
largest Brazilian institutional shareholders are pension funds associated to large state-
owned business groups in the energy, financial, and infrastructure sectors. Compensation 
is lower in state-owned enterprises and, thus, institutional investors relevant shareholding 
may simply reflect this (PINTO and LEAL, 2013). Thus, the question is whether BOD 
member characteristics stand out in compensation decisions even in the presence high 
ownership concentration or if they are blurred by other well-known compensation 
determinants. For instance, previous studies suggest that financial disclosure may be the 
most important corporate governance aspect in Brazil and other emerging markets (LEAL 
and CARVALHAL-DA-SILVA, 2007).   
The empirical tests employed data from 2010 through 2013 reported under a new 
and more demanding disclosure regime introduced in 2009. These new rules include the 
composition of BOD and senior management compensation but require only the 
maximum, minimum, and average of total individual compensation, in place of identified 
individual compensation reporting. The ensuing analysis used the total for all individuals 
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and average of individual compensation, including all of its components, in senior 
management and the BOD, separately.  
The sample characteristics of the average BOD are: seven people, 56 years of age, 
16 percent of independent directors, eight percent of women, three different academic 
backgrounds among directors, and only one committee with a majority of outside 
members. The percentage of independent directors is small even with a majority of outside 
directors, suggesting that major shareholders appoint most of them. The median annual 
total compensation levels were US$ 1.8 and US$ 0.3 million for senior managers and 
directors, respectively. BOD maximum total compensation figures confirm that some 
directors make much more than others. Companies traded in the two most demanding 
premium listings of the stock exchange display greater academic background diversity, 
busier and more independent boards, and committees with a majority of outside directors, 
but less gender diversity. These companies may possibly require a more professional BOD, 
with more experienced and busier directors, even though they do not hire many women. 
Companies traded in the two most demanding premium lists also display larger total 
compensation and less ownership concentration.   
Univariate tests for some of the BOD characteristics suggested an association with 
compensation. Companies with less homogeneous and passive boards are larger, with 
better corporate governance and disclosure practices, have lower ownership 
concentration, and, in contrast to the managerial power hypothesis, pay more to their 
senior managers and BOD members. Yet, the homogeneity and passivity scores are not 
significant in our multivariate analysis. A dummy variable indicates whether a company 
trades in the two most demanding listing levels of the stock exchange and proxies for the 
quality of its corporate governance and disclosure practices because they must comply 
with more stringent requirements about these practices. They possibly tend to pay more to 
their BOD members and senior managers because they need to hire more qualified, highly 
demanded, and independent people. Companies that are larger and add value to 
shareholders also pay more, as suggested by Jensen and Murphy (1990).  
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) assert that disclosure, specially financial 
disclosure, is the aspect with the larger impact over shareholder value in the Brazilian 
corporate governance practices indices they built. Thus, consistently with this conclusion, 
our board characteristics scores did not show significance in a multivariate model that 
included the aforementioned proxy for the quality of corporate governance practices. 
Nevertheless, one cannot discard the managerial power hypothesis entirely because even 
lower ownership concentration companies cannot be considered dispersed equity capital 
enterprises. BODs are more homogeneous and passive in higher ownership concentration 
companies, which pay less to their senior managers and directors. On the other hand, as 
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pointed out by Pinto and Leal (2013), compensation dispersion is significant in higher 
ownership concentration family-owned companies. Thus, company size, a broad measure 
of corporate governance quality, and ownership concentration seem to dominate the BOD 
composition characteristics sampled in terms of their association to the outcome of 
compensation decisions.  
This paper proceeds with a background and literature review section, followed by a 
presentation of the data and method. The results section details the findings and the final 
section concludes.  
 
2 – BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1  Recent Brazilian related events 
The Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) instituted new regulation by the end of 
2009 that drastically expanded what companies must disclose in their annual filings. 
Instruction CVM 480 of 7 December 2009 introduced the Reference Form (Formulário de 
Referência or FR) that companies must use to disclose information, such as financial 
statements, risk factors and policy, operational and economic issues and projections, 
management discussion, corporate governance policies and rules, internal controls and 
related party transactions, securities trading policies, as well as compensation details, 
among other topics. Before the introduction of the new compensation disclosure demands 
in the FR, Brazilian companies reported a budget for the total lumped compensation of the 
BOD and senior managers that had to be approved annually in the General Shareholders 
Assembly and provided only general statements about their compensation policy and 
instruments.  
The focus of this article is on the total compensation amount disclosed on section 
13 of the FR. Companies must disclose the sum for all individuals and the average, 
minimum, and maximum individual total compensation for the BOD and senior 
management, separately. Total compensation includes all forms of benefits to BOD 
members and senior managers such as wages, bonuses, options and stock plans, and 
insurance, severance and retirement benefits. Yet, companies are not required to disclose 
compensation of individual in senior management and the BOD. Thus, it is not clear how 
much each BOD and senior management member earns.  
Between 15 and 20 percent of Brazilian listed companies, depending on the year 
considered, still do not comply with this disclosure. They rely on a court injunction secured 
by the Brazilian Institute of Financial Executives in 2010 that guarantees its members the 
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right of non-compliance. The plaintiffs claim that the new regulation made their members 
more vulnerable to criminals, particularly kidnapers, because divulging the maximum 
senior management and BOD compensation is akin to revealing how much the most 
important people in the company earn. Be as it may, Barros et al. (2015) do not find 
support for the personal safety argument. They conclude that non-compliance is positively 
related to company size and ownership concentration and negatively associated to the 
quality of corporate governance practices and profitability. Even so, the court injunction 
may remain in effect for many years because the Brazilian judiciary will certainly take from 
one to two decades to reach a final decision on the matter, given the many opportunities 
for appeals and procrastination offered by the local judicial process.  
The Brazilian stock exchange added three premium-listing segments in 2000 to its 
single existing list. The existing list at the time became the "traditional" list and it does not 
require anything in addition to the legal requirements. The three premium lists require that 
companies comply with increasingly more demanding corporate governance and 
disclosure practices. Companies voluntarily join the listing level that they desire. The three 
new lists are, in ascending order of rigor of their demands: Level 1, Level 2, and Novo 
Mercado (New Market or NM). Interestingly, not even the most rigorous list (NM) includes 
demands about compensation. Finally, there are a few Brazilian corporate governance 
codes. The Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute (IBGC) produced the most widely 
used. It recommends that companies disclose individual compensation and, if they do not 
do it, that they explain why. However, there is no regulatory comply or explain requirement 
relative to any of the existing codes.  
 
2.2  Brief literature review  
Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that compensation is directly related to 
company size, value, and performance. Larger companies may be more complex and 
demand more and better managers, which should be able to deliver better corporate 
performance and increase market value. This is not free of controversy. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2005) claim that the relationship between compensation and performance is weak due to 
the design of variable compensation packages.  
Silva and Chien (2013) investigate compensation in 420 Brazilian listed companies 
between 2002 and 2009, before the FR compensation disclosure rules. They do not find a 
significant relationship between total compensation and relative market value or 
performance. Correia, Amaral, and Louvet (2014) analyzed total compensation in the 
1997-2006 period, prior to the introduction of the FR as well. They find a positive and 
significant association between compensation and company size and a negative and 
significant relationship between compensation and relevant institutional investor 
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ownership. Relevant ownership defined as greater than the five percent legal threshold for 
disclosure.  The largest institutional investors in Brazil are pension funds linked to the 
largest state-owned companies. Pinto and Leal (2013) indicated that state-owned 
companies pay significantly less to their BOD and senior managers than other companies. 
Thus, the Correia et al. finding may simply reflect state ownership.  
Ownership concentration may be detrimental to compensation decisions in Brazil. 
Sternberg, Leal, and Bortolon (2011) showed that Brazil is a high ownership concentration 
economy. Even though major and controlling shareholders may monitor management 
compensation more closely than widely dispersed shareholders, they may also abuse their 
power and compensate themselves generously above professional managers when they 
act as senior managers or BOD members, specially in family controlled companies 
(BARONTINI and BOZZI, 2011; VILLALONG and AMIT, 2006). Consistently, Pinto and 
Leal (2013) show that Brazilian companies with no controlling shareholder or coalition (a 
bloc of shareholders with more than 50% of the voting shares) pay an average of 79 
percent more to senior managers, twice more to the chief executive officer (CEO), and 80 
percent more to BOD members. This result refers to 315 listed companies in 2009, the 
first year of FR reporting. They also conclude that compensation decreases as ownership 
concentration increases but that family controlled companies pay 43 percent more to their 
CEOs and that BOD compensation increases proportionally to family membership in the 
BOD. This previous Brazilian evidence suggests that company size, ownership 
concentration, and the identity of controlling shareholders may be relevant compensation 
determinants.  
 
2.3  BOD characteristics aspects  
This article intends to gauge the relationship between BOD characteristics and 
compensation. Group decision-making is subject to the effects of social interactions 
among group members. Group formation, cohesion, and characteristics may be related to 
the outcomes of its decisions. Dorff (2007) believes that groupthink and information 
cascades are two aspects of social interaction that may affect BOD decision making, 
particularly in compensation decisions.  
Janis (1982) defines groupthink as flaws in decision making by a cohesive group 
striving for unanimity. This cohesive group operates with civility and under specific 
cooperation norms and may place greater value on consensus than on the critical 
evaluation of alternate courses of action. Janis (1982) believes that groupthink is more 
likely to occur when groups are not very diverse and have limited time for decisions that 
may greatly impact group members. Bainbridge (2002) relates the propensity of 
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groupthink in BODs to the demographic characteristics of its members, their social status, 
the importance and quantity of decisions, and the time availability of directors.  
BOD member diversity may reduce homogeneity and extreme cohesion and 
potentially mitigate groupthink. Subrahmanyam (2008) argues that CEOs and directors 
are less likely to belong to the same social network when boards are more heterogeneous, 
leading to better corporate governance practices, lower executive compensation, and 
more and better debate. Yet, Bebchuk and Fried (2005) stress that directors are commonly 
chosen through the social networks of incumbent directors.  
Silveira and Barros (2013) developed a score to gauge BOD homogeneity in 
French companies that considers gender and foreigner membership, tenure, and age and 
academic background dispersion. This article develops a similar score. Even though there 
are claims that homogeneity is directly associated to groupthink, we do not assume or 
attempt to verify this relationship by means of the score herein because homogeneity may 
also be related to other group behavior aspects.  
Information cascades occur when a group member disregards his or her own 
information or opinion and finds that the optimal decision is to follow the opinion or vote 
of a preceding member in a situation that group members voice their opinions openly and 
sequentially, as in a BOD meeting (BIKHCHANDANI, HIRSHLEIFER, and WELCH, 1992). 
Group members begin to ignore their own private information and follow the prevailing 
votes after a certain point in such setting (DORFF, 2007). When the first few that voice 
their opinions are group leaders, most powerful members, or those that possess privileged 
information they induce or aggravate information cascades. Dorff (2007) states that 
following the decision of others may be desirable in social networks even when in conflict 
with own private information. Information cascades may be confounded with groupthink 
because consensus is reached either way.  
Dorff (2007) asserts that information cascades are related to decision makers with 
little private information witnessing individual decisions voiced openly within the group by 
preceding decision makers under time limitations. More time availability could lead to a 
greater propensity to consider other alternatives. González, Modernell, and París (2006) 
found evidence of information cascades in experiments with a three people board where 
the second to vote tends to follow the first, who has more private information than the 
others. Dorff (2007) argues that directors are busy people with little incentive to search for 
information independently to assess complex decisions. Directors may participate in 
several boards or in another senior management team, limiting their time availability.  
Santos and Silveira (2007) suggest that Brazilian directors are busy because of 
pervasive board interlocking and other senior management commitments. Silveira and 
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Barros (2013) assert that busy boards and those in which powerful company leaders set 
the agenda tend to be more passive, inducing information cascades. These authors 
proposed a BOD passivity score that inspired the passivity score employed herein. We do 
not assume that passive boards show information cascades or attempt to verify it.  
Pinto and Leal (2013) evince that Brazilian companies that voluntarily joined the 
two most demanding listing levels of the Brazilian stock exchange pay more to senior 
managers and BOD members. Thus, better corporate governance and disclosure practices 
may be positively associated to greater compensation levels in Brazil. Lower ownership 
concentration and company size are also positively related to compensation levels. The 
companies in the two most demanding trading lists display lower ownership concentration. 
These empirical results suggest that compensation is larger in better-governed and 
lower ownership concentration companies. It is reasonable to believe that less 
homogeneous and passive boards are more often present in these companies. If this were 
verified, the Brazilian evidence suggests that less homogeneous and passive boards grant 
larger compensation packages, possibly in face of more complex compliance and 
business demands. On the other hand, higher ownership concentration and poorly 
governed companies should display more homogeneous and passive boards. 
Compensation could be lower in these companies because major shareholders control 
compensation packages tightly. This, however, does not exclude outlier compensation 
values to major shareholders when they hold senior management and board seats. This 
evidence contrasts with the managerial power hypothesis that implies that better-governed 
companies would display less homogeneous and passive boards that grant lower 
compensation packages. Thus, there is no clear hypothesis about BOD characteristics and 
compensation levels.  
 
3 – DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The Appendix contains details about the definitions of the variables employed in 
this article. Company compensation level is the dependent variable. It is implemented 
through four variables measuring total and average individual compensation for the BOD 
and senior management in logarithm form. We considered the total compensation of 
BOD and senior management, including wages and other cash payments, such as 
bonuses and profit sharing, direct and indirect benefits, severance payments, stock grants, 
and stock options. Regulation requires the disclosure of the maximum, average, and 
median of individual compensations. Barros et al. (2015) report that many companies use 
a court injunction in order to avoid reporting these figures alleging that their senior officers 
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would be at a greater risk of criminal acts. Companies are not required to report 
individualized compensation figures.  
The main explanatory variables are two scores that aspire to capture BOD 
homogeneity and passivity based on the proposal advanced by Silveira and Barros (2013, 
p. 45-48) in their analysis of French companies. The scores and their components are built 
as dummy variables. The first score collects personal characteristics of the individuals that 
comprise the BOD: age, gender, and academic background. Panel A of Table 1 shows 
how we obtained the homogeneity score (HS). The second score gathers BOD 
characteristics such as time availability, number of committees, and the proportion of 
independent BOD members. It attempts to capture the potential passivity of BOD 
members because they may lack the proper time availability and independence or the 
board is not satisfactorily structured. Panel B of Table 1 shows the passivity score (PS). 
These BOD characteristics are typically addressed in recommendations for BOD 
improvement, such as those listed in Leblanc (2013).  
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Table 1 –  Homogeneity and Passivity Scores 
 
Dummy Variable Definition 
Panel A: homogeneity score (HS):  
ACBKG The academic background profile is defined as business, 
technological, legal, and other. Null if three or more profiles 
are present in the BOD in each company-year; 1 otherwise.  
AGE Null if the standard deviation of the age of BOD members in 
each company-year is greater than the median standard 
deviation of the age of BOD members in each company-year 
in the sample; 1 otherwise.  
GENDER Null if the percentage of female directors in the board of 
directors (BOD) relative to the total of BOD members in each 
company-year is greater than the sample median; 1 otherwise.  
HS Null if the sum of the values of GENDER, AGE, and ACDCKG 
is less than 2; 1 otherwise, indicating greater BOD 
homogeneity.  
Panel B: passivity score (PS):  
AVAIL Null if the percentage of non-executive BOD members that 
hold five or more BOD or executive positions elsewhere 
relative to the total of BOD members in each company-year is 
less than the sample median of this percentage; 1 otherwise.  
CEO Null if the percentage of directors that are CEOs of other 
companies relative to the total of outside BOD members in 
each company-year is less than the sample median of this 
percentage; 1 otherwise.  
COMM Null if the percentage of BOD committees made up of 50% or 
more of outside members is 2 or more; 1 otherwise.   
INDEP Null if the percentage of BOD members declared as 
independent relative to the total of BOD members in each 
company-year greater or equal to the sample median of this 
percentage; 1 otherwise.  
PS Null if the sum of CEO, COMM, INDEP, and AVAIL is less 
than 2; 1 otherwise, indicating greater BOD passivity.  
 
 
The new regulation demanding more details about compensation disclosure and 
BOD characteristics, among many other items, was introduced at the end of 2009 
comprising their annual filings according to the FR. The Brazilian securities commission 
availed software for standardized company uploading of their BOD and compensation 
information in 2010. Thus, BOD and compensation information was hand-collected from 
items 12 and 13 of the FR, respectively, for years 2010 through 2013. The initial sampled 
year was the first one in which the company upload software was available. The FR was 
introduced for reporting the 2009 information but collection format was not standardized 
until 2010. Information prior to 2009 was provided under a different regulation and 
format and did not contain the details needed for the analysis in this article. We used the 
most recent FR available for a given year, since companies may update their annual filings 
as much as they want. The number of listed companies included in the sample for each 
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year was 328, 337, 343, and 331, respectively for 2010 through 2013, totaling 1,339 
firm-years.  
The total number of firm-years initially considered for the two scores was 1,339. 
There were 1,083 firm-years with senior management compensation information. There 
were 203 cases of null firm-year compensation for senior management that were excluded 
from the analysis as probable reporting mistakes. The remaining firms did not report 
compensation due to the aforementioned court injunction and were also excluded from 
the analysis. Regarding BOD compensation, 1,111 firm-years reported it. Fifty-three firm-
years reporting null BOD together with non-null senior management compensation were 
considered valid because there are firms with null BOD compensation (Pinto and Leal, 
2013, p. 312; IBGC, 2014, p. 21). We assigned a BOD compensation value of 1 to 
these firm-years to allow for the logarithm.  
The control variables include the total (voting and non-voting) ownership 
percentage of the largest shareholder, listing in the two most demanding premium lists of 
the Brazilian stock exchange to proxy for the quality of corporate governance practices of 
the company, firm size, return on assets, and relative market value (the price-to-book 
ratio), as described in the Appendix. The set of control variables was extracted from the 
Economatica® database. The previous Brazilian literature reviewed indicates that these 
controls are significant determinants of compensation levels (SILVA and CHIEN, 2013; 
CORREIA et al., 2014; BARROS et al., 2015). We apply panel regressions to analyze the 
influence of the BOD characteristics scores on compensation. Details on the 
implementation of the models are provided in the following section and in the notes to the 
tables.  
 
4 – RESULTS 
 
4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables for all firm-
years in the panel. Descriptive statistics for each year are available upon request but do 
not reveal different patterns. The average BOD includes seven members. Eighty-three 
percent of BOD members are outsiders but companies declared only 16 percent 
independent, on average. These results are consistent with those in Brugni et al. (2013). 
Four percent of the outside BOD members held seats in more than five BODs and three 
percent were CEOs in other companies. The average BOD member age was 56. Boards 
included only eight percent of women and, typically, three different academic backgrounds 
among directors. There was an average of only one committee with a majority of outside 
members per board.  
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The average exchange rate was 1.8874 Brazilian reais (R$) per US dollars (US$) in 
the 2010-2013 period, according to Brazilian Central Bank annual averages and own 
calculations. The average total annual compensation of all senior managers was R$ 9.9 
million (US$ 5.2 million) but the corresponding median was only R$ 3.4 million (US$ 1.8 
million), indicating a skewed distribution. The average of the average individual annual 
compensation figures for senior managers was R$ 1.8 million (US$ 1.0 million) and the 
corresponding median was R$ 0.8 million (US$ 0.4 million). The average and median 
total compensation of all BOD members were R$ 1.5 million (US$ 0.8 million) and R$ 0.5 
million (US$ 0.3 million), respectively, but the maximum was a whopping R$ 104 million 
(US$ 55.1 million). Pinto and Leal (2013) suggested that many times the most powerful 
person in a Brazilian company is a BOD member and not the CEO. For example, 
controlling shareholders sometimes prefer to command their companies from the BOD 
without assuming CEO responsibilities and dealing with the day-to-day operation and 
compliance issues of the company. The average and median of the average individual 
annual BOD member compensation are R$ 310 thousand (US$ 164 thousand) and R$ 
70 thousand (US$ 37 thousand), respectively. Panel B of Table 2 portrays these figures.  
The control variables are in Panel C of Table 2. The average total asset of the 
sample companies is R$ 19 billion (US$ 10 billion). N2NM is a dummy variable indicating 
if a company is listed in the two most demanding listing levels of the exchange (Novo 
Mercado or Level 2) and proxies for the quality of its corporate governance practices. 
Forty-one percent of the sample companies are listed in Novo Mercado or Level 2. The 
percentage of the total equity capital, including voting and non-voting shares, of the 
largest shareholder averages 45 percent, consistent with Sternberg et al. (2011) that report 
a very high degree of ownership concentration. Finally, the median return on assets and 
price-to-book ratio are 2.85 percent per year and 1.32, respectively.  
A correlation analysis, omitted here but available with the authors, showed that HS 
and PS are positive and significantly correlated (0.43). These scores are also positive and 
significantly correlated with ownership concentration and negative and significantly 
correlated with firm size and N2NM. Consistently, firm size is positive and significantly 





Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 2010-2013 
 
Variable Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum No obs. 
Panel A: characteristics of the board of directors   
Ac. Backg. 3 3 1 7 1 1339 
Age 56 56 7 89 35 1339 
Busy 4% 0% 13% 100% 0% 1339 
CEO-other 3% 0% 9% 50% 0% 1339 
Committees 1 0 1 10 0 1339 
Independent 16% 0% 19% 100% 0% 1339 
Outsider 83% 86% 18% 100% 0% 1339 
SD of age 10 10 5 132 0 1339 
Size 7 7 3 24 1 1339 
Woman 8% 0% 14% 100% 0% 1339 
Panel B: compensation variables (in R$ thousands)  
TMC 12,200 5,029 33,300 454,000 0.137 1083 
AMC 2,280 1,041 8,999 177,000 0.000 1083 
TBC 1,851 676 6,196 104,000 0.001 1111 
ABC 377 103 2,466 72,700 0.000 1111 
Panel C: control variables  
TA 19.00 2.25 96.60 1,160 0.00 1322 
N2NM 0.41 0.00 0.49 1.00 0.00 1339 
PB 1.92 1.32 8.21 71.93 -224.15 1116 
ROA -2.50% 2.85% 1,880% 58,971% -31,476% 1321 
T1 45% 39% 26% 100% 5% 1337 
Notes: all variables defined in the Appendix. All currency figures in Brazilian reais (R$). TA in Panel C in R$ 
billions. The average exchange rate in the 2010-2013 period was R$ 1,8874 per US$. SD is standard 
deviation. There were 328, 337, 343, and 331 for 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively. There were 
47, 48, 44, and 89 companies that did not inform compensation of BOD and senior management in 2010, 
2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively, and were omitted from the analysis. The cases in which the senior 
management team compensation was informed and non-null and the BOD compensation was null were 
included in the analysis.  
 
 
4.2  Mean and median tests 
Table 3 shows mean and median tests of each component of HS e PS according to 
N2NM. HS and PS and their individual components assume values of 1 or 0, with one 
suggesting more homogeneous or passive boards, respectively. Panel A of Table 3 shows 
that HS is lower for the companies listed in the two most demanding segments of the 
exchange. However, the individual components of HS do not display a consistent 
behavior. Age is not significantly different in the two categories of N2NM. Gender diversity 
is lower when companies are listed in the two most demanding listing segments, while the 
academic background of board members is more diverse in those companies. Firm size is 
positively correlated with N2NM, thus there should be greater academic background 
diversity and less gender diversity in the boards of larger firms.  
PS is significantly lower when N2NM is equal to one according to Panel B of Table 
3. Companies listed in the two most demanding lists significantly use more committees 
with outside BOD member majority, have more independent directors but display greater 
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board interlocking. This insinuates that the BODs in these companies may be structured 
more formally and employ more outside and independent, but busier, directors because 
these firms search for more experienced, reputed, and well connected directors.  
Finally, Panel C of Table 3 shows that the senior management and BOD 
compensation are significantly larger when N2NM is equal to one, denoting a possible 
effort to hire more experienced and qualified professionals. Results for the BOD 
compensation reflect a skewed mean possibly due to extreme values associated to large 
compensation packages to controlling shareholders who are BOD members, as suggested 
by Pinto and Leal (2013).  
 
Table 3 – Mean and median tests according to premium exchange listing (N2NM) 
 








Panel A: homogeneity score (HS) and its components 
HS 0.49 0.51 0.45 2.26 2.26 790 549 
AGE 0.50 0.51 0.48 1.12 1.12 790 549 
ACBKG 0.34 0.39 0.26 5.16 5.11 790 549 
GENDER 0.64 0.61 0.68 -2.86 -2.85 790 549 
Panel B: passivity score (PS) and its components 
PS 0.69 0.87 0.44 19.25 17.04 790 549 
AVAIL 0.15 0.12 0.18 -3.04 -3.03 790 549 
CEO 0.15 0.14 0.16 -0.84 -0.85 790 549 
COMM 0.79 0.89 0.64 11.46 10.94 790 549 
INDEP 0.54 0.83 0.12 36.09 25.69 790 549 
Panel C: senior management and BOD total compensation (R$ millions)  
TMC 12.20 10.30 14.40 -2.05 -14.23 580 503 
log(TMC) 15.26 14.72 15.88 -11.96 -14.23 580 503 
TBC 1.85 1.96 1.72 .064 -8.30 605 506 
log(TBC) 12.70 12.13 13.38 -6.45 -8.30 605 506 
Notes: all variables defined in Table 1 and the Appendix. The average exchange rate in the 2010-2013 
period was R$ 1,8874 per US$. N2NM is equal to 1 when the company is listed under the two most 
demanding segments of the Brazilian exchange. t is the mean equality t-test according to N2NM. z is the 
Mann-Whitney median equality test z-score according to N2NM. Values in bold are significant at the 5 
percent level.  
 
 
Table 4 shows the mean and median of the control variables according the HS and 
PS dummy variables. Companies with a unit HS or PS are smaller, display greater 
ownership concentration, and are usually not listed in the two most demanding segments 
of the stock exchange. Results are not significant or conclusive for the return on assets and 
price-to-book ratio.  
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Table 4 – Mean and median tests according to the homogeneity and passivity scores 
 









TA 14.75 13.80 7.10 6.19 678 644 
N2NM 0.44 0.38 2.26 2.26 687 652 
PB 1.87 1.99 -0.25 0.80 606 510 
ROA -0.15 0.11 -0.26 2.65 678 643 
T1 0.42 0.49 -4.35 -3.87 687 652 









TA 15.46 13.76 12.16 12.59 411 911 
N2NM 0.75 0.26 19.25 17.04 411 928 
PB 2.47 1.62 1.66 6.34 395 721 
ROA 0.04 -0.05 0.09 4.24 411 910 
T1 0.35 0.50 -9.91 -9.44 411 928 
Notes: all variables defined in Table 1 and the Appendix. TA in R$ billions. The average exchange rate in the 
2010-2013 period was R$ 1,8874 per US$. HS and PS are equal to 1 when the company possibly has 
more homogeneous and passive BODs. t is the mean equality t-test according to HS or PS. z is the Mann-




Table 5 shows a preliminary univariate analysis of compensation according to HS 
and PS and their individual components. Panels A and B show the total senior 
management compensation results. Senior management compensation is significantly 
larger when HS and PS are equal to one. The HS result for senior management is largely 
driven by the academic background diversity in the BOD because the results for the other 
variables are weaker. The results for the individual components of PS in Panel B are more 
difficult to interpret. Senior management compensation is larger when there is greater use 
of committees with a majority of outside members and a larger number of independent 
BOD members, which is consistent with the conjecture that senior management 
compensation increases as companies become larger and more complex, as reflected by 
the number of committees and independent directors in the BOD. Senior management 
compensation is significantly smaller when there are more BOD members who are CEOs 
or occupy board seats in other companies. It is difficult to say how the presence of these 
BOD members inhibits greater pay for senior management.  
Finally, Panels C and D of Table 5 depict the results for the total BOD 
compensation. BOD compensation is also significantly larger when HS and PS are equal 
to one. The HS result in Panel C is also driven by the academic background diversity in the 
BOD because the results for the other variables are weaker. Greater academic 
background diversity may be associated to boards in larger and more complex 
companies. The results for the individual components of PS in Panel D are more difficult to 
19 
interpret once again. As with the total compensation of senior management, the total 
compensation of the BOD is larger when there are more committees with a majority of 
outside members and a larger number of independent directors. The greater presence of 
BOD members who are also CEOs or directors in other companies is associated to a 
lower total compensation to the BOD.  
In general, these preliminary results are similar for the total compensation of senior 
management and BOD. Greater BOD member academic background diversity and 
independence and BOD use of committees with a majority of outside members are 
associated with larger compensation packages. This is consistent with the fact that greater 
use of committees and independent directors is associated with company size and possibly 
complexity. On the other hand, more BOD members who are CEOs and directors in other 
companies are related to lower compensation packages.  At first, this evidence seems 
contradictory because busy boards would place less energy in compensation decisions and 
be less inclined to reduce the compensation packages of their peers, especially if they 
belong to the same social network. However, our correlation analysis shows that HS and 
PS are positively and significantly correlated with ownership concentration evincing the 
influence of major shareholders over directors in general.  Moreover, Brugni et al. (2013) 
point out that 75 percent of Brazilian directors in their sample were nominated by 
controlling shareholders.  
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Table 5 – Mean and median tests of compensation according to the homogeneity (HS) 










Panel A: log of total management compensation (TMC) and HS 
HS 15.46 15.03 4.17 3.46 585 498 
AGE 15.38 15.14 2.27 1.96 556 527 
ACBKG 15.38 15.00 3.48 4.17 745 338 
GENDER 15.32 15.23 0.81 0.57 405 678 
Panel B: log of total management compensation (TMC) and PS 
PS 15.96 14.88 10.54 11.74 382 701 
AVAIL 15.15 15.87 -5.10 -4.93 916 167 
CEO 15.19 15.63 -3.08 -3.71 915 168 
COMM 16.34 14.91 12.95 14.17 268 815 
INDEP 15.74 14.75 10.15 12.55 559 524 
Panel C: log of total BOD compensation (TBC) and HS 
HS 13.03 12.32 3.61 5.53 595 516 
AGE 12.80 12.59 1.10 2.94 572 539 
ACBKG 12.86 12.36 2.36 5.24 758 353 
GENDER 12.96 12.54 2.04 1.76 416 695 
Panel D: log of total BOD compensation (TBC) and PS 
PS 13.78 12.13 8.21 11.25 383 728 
AVAIL 12.50 13.80 -4.82 -5.69 938 173 
CEO 12.68 12.79 -038 -2.48 940 171 
COMM 14.41 12.15 10.24 14.19 268 843 
INDEP 13.38 11.99 7.18 9.23 564 547 
Notes: The compensation variables are in R$ millions defined in the Appendix. The average exchange rate in 
the 2010-2013 period was R$ 1,8874 per US$. HS and PS are equal to 1 when the company possibly has 
more homogeneous and passive BODs. Their components are defined in Table 1. t is the mean equality t-
test according to HS, PS or each one of their components. z is the Mann-Whitney median equality test z-




4.3  Panel models  
Tables 6 and 7 show the results for the total and average compensation of senior 
management and the BOD, respectively. Four different models are displayed for each one 
of the four compensation variables. The notes in the tables offer details about the models. 
The Breusch-Pagan (1980) test, not shown, indicated that panel regressions were better 
than ordinary least square regressions for all models, suggesting that the intercepts across 
individuals are not equal. Fixed effect panel models assume that non-observed individual 
hetorogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables and is time invariant. This kind of 
panel model is unbiased by time invariant omitted characteristics but cannot be used to 
investigate the influence of these characteristics on the dependent variable (Kennedy, p. 
303-307). Thus, the dummy N2NM was omitted in the fixed effect models because it does 
not vary in time. Random effects panel models, on the other hand, assume that non-
observed individual hetorogeneity is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and has a 
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random component. This kind of model allows the inclusion of time invariant explanatory 
variables. The Hausman (1978) test verifies the correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the random effects. The null is that random effects panel models estimators 
are unbiased.  
Table 6 shows the panel model results for the total and average compensation of 
the senior management team. Models I through III in Table 6 use fixed effects and model 
IV uses random effects panel regressions following the results of the Hausman (1978) tests 
reported in the table. The HS and PS scores do not display any significance in the panel 
models even when they are the only explanatory variables. Model IV includes firm size, 
ownership concentration, and the corporate governance quality proxy and is the only one 
with a noteworthy adjusted R2. Not surprisingly, senior management compensation 
increases with firm size, the quality of corporate governance practices, and the price-to-
book ratio, and decreases with ownership concentration, a result suggested by our 
univariate analysis and already reported for Brazil by Pinto and Leal (2013) for 2009 and 
Silva and Chien (2013, p. 494) for the period between 2002 and 2009, prior to the new 
FR disclosure regulation. Board characteristics do not seem to be associated with senior 
management compensation when taken jointly in the two scores. The other explanatory 
variables, which may influence board characteristics as well as compensation, are possibly 
more important as determinants of Brazilian senior management compensation. This is 
consistent with the Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) assertion that disclosure was the 




Table 6 – Panel models for senior management compensation 2010-2013 
 
  Total Management Compensation Average Management Comp. 

























TA – – – 0.39 
(0.00) 
– – – 0.25 
(0.00) 
























N2NM – – – 0.79 
(0.00) 
– – – 0.64 
(0.00) 
T1 – – – -0.45 
(0.10) 


















Adj. R2 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.37 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.20 
No. Obs. 1083 937 937 937 1079 934 934 934 
Groups 310 279 279 279 310 279 279 279 
HT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.53 
Notes: All variable definitions in Table 1 and the Appendix. Figures in parenthesis are p-values for the 
coefficient significance t-tests. HT is the p-value for the null that a random effects model is preferable in a 
Hausman (1978) test. Models IV for the two dependent variables are random effects models. Variable 
N2NM was omitted in the fixed effects models because it does not display year-to-year variability.  
 
Results for the total and average BOD compensation are in Table 7. Total and 
average BOD compensation is positive and significantly associated with firm size and the 
proxy for the quality of corporate governance practices. The results for the HS and PS 
dummies are weak once again. HS and PS displayed a negative marginal significance only 
in one model each, suggesting that more homogeneous and passive boards enjoy lower 
compensation packages, which is consistent with the conjectures in this article. Only 




Table 7- Panel models for board of director's (BOD) compensation 2010-2013 
 
  Total BOD Compensation Average BOD Compensation 

























TA – – – 0.59 
(0.00) 
– – – 0.46 
(0.00) 
































T1 – – – -0.53 
(0.33) 


















Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.11 
No. Obs. 1111 958 958 958 1110 958 958 958 
Groups 319 287 287 287 318 287 287 287 
HT 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.57 
Notes: All variable definitions in Table 1 and the Appendix. Figures in parenthesis are p-values for the 
coefficient significance t-tests. HT is the p-value for the null that a random effects model is preferable in a 
Hausman (1978) test. Models II and IV for the two dependent variables are random effects models. Variable 
N2NM was omitted in the fixed effects models because it does not display year-to-year variability.  
 
 
Silva and Chien (2013) studied the determinants of performance and included the 
overall total and average joint compensation of senior management and the BOD as 
explanatory variables because that is what was available prior to the regulatory change by 
the end of 2009. They find that compensation is positive and significantly related to the 
price-to-book ratio but no relationship with the return on assets, which is consistent with 
the results presented above.  
In general, the evidence for HS and PS is disappointing. These board characteristics 
scores do not have a significant relationship with compensation and are superseded by 
better known explanatory variables such as firm size, ownership concentration, relative 
market value, and a proxy for the overall quality of corporate governance and disclosure 
practices of the company. The intercepts of all models are significant, suggesting that 
future research should engage in searching for more determinants of compensation. 
Naturally, the choice of score implementation adopted herein may have also influenced 




4.4  Robustness checks 
We do not address endogeneity issues further because of the lack of significance of 
the board characteristics dummies. The HS and PS dummies are a function of the median 
of each specific component. An alternative definition is to measure each component of 
these scores according to the quartiles of the underlying variable. Thus, the alternate HS 
has three components that assume values between 0 and 3, depending on the quartile. 
This alternative HS is the sum of the scores for each individual component and varies 
between 0 and 9. An alternate PS redefined in the same way takes on values between 0 
and 12 because it has four individual components assuming values ranging between 0 
and 3 each. This replacement criterion expands the range of categorical values that each 
original score had. Yet, the panel regression results with the alternative scores are weaker 
than those with the original scores. We have also produced a battery of descriptive 
statistics, preliminary tests, and OLS regressions for each individual year but they do not 
add any new information to the more synthetic panel results above. These outcomes are 
not included in the article but are available upon request.  
 
5 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
Two scores attempt to capture the degree of homogeneity and passivity of the 
board of directors of Brazilian listed companies. A change in the reporting regulation at 
the end of 2009 and a new software standardization to input the data released in 2010 
made available more information about the board characteristics in these scores. This 
article used an average of 335 companies per year in a panel from 2010 through 2013 
to investigate if the scores are significant determinants of senior management and board 
of director compensation. The two scores were implemented as dummy variables, 
assuming the value of 1 when boards are supposedly more homogeneous or passive.   
One conjecture was that more homogeneous and passive boards could decide in 
favor of more generous compensation packages, according to the managerial power 
hypothesis (BEBCHUK and FRIED, 2005). In high ownership concentration environment of 
Brazil, this could translate into greater compensation for controlling shareholders and their 
family members or representatives when they act as managers or directors.   
The results from panel regression models did not reveal any significance for the 
scores. Other well-known determinants of compensation, such as a proxy for the overall 
quality of the corporate governance practices of the company, firm size, and the price-to-
book ratio were positive and significantly associated with senior management and board 
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compensation, whereas total equity ownership concentration of the largest shareholder 
was negative and significantly associated with compensation.  
The evidence for these variables is consistent with prior Brazilian findings in Pinto 
and Leal (2013) for 2009 and Silva and Chen (2013) for a period before the new 
disclosure regulation. This evidence is also consistent with the conjecture that certain 
corporate governance practices may have greater influence than others, as suggested by 
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) about disclosure practices.  
Even though the homogeneity and passivity scores did not display significance in 
the panel models, our univariate analysis revealed associations between compensation 
and some board characteristics. The academic background diversity of board members, 
the proportion of independent directors, and the number of committees with a majority of 
outside members seem to be positively associated to senior management and director 
compensation. On the other hand, the compensation of senior management and directors 
are lower when more board members act as CEOs and directors of other companies 
possibly because the board passivity indicator is positively and significantly associated to 
ownership concentration.  
These univariate results, however, do not transpire in the multivariate models 
probably because other variables, particularly the proxy for the quality of corporate 
governance practices and firm size, are core determinants of compensation and, when 
taken jointly, may represent potential substitutes to measure the same constructs. For 
example, academic background diversity is not mutually exclusive with gender diversity 
and may also be strongly related to firm size, board functioning complexity (more 
committees, for example), and more outside directors (and possibly more interlocking), all 
of them being reflected in the quality of corporate governance practices proxy.  
The univariate analysis also showed that firm size, better quality of corporate 
governance practices, and ownership concentration are associated with the individual 
variables used in the board homogeneity and passivity scores. Larger firms with less 
concentrated ownership and better corporate governance practices may display more 
diverse and less passive boards. Better-governed firms may also display boards with 
greater academic background diversity, with more independent but busier directors, and 
more committees comprised with a majority of outside directors. Somewhat surprisingly, 
these companies have significantly less board gender diversity.   
Future research may have to compile broader and more detailed board and 
director characteristics metrics. It is possible that a better appraisal of the complexity of 
board tasks through an analysis of their agenda, minutes, frequency of meetings, and 
director absenteeism, for example, yields better metrics. Board diversity should also include 
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other characteristics such as nationality, regional origin, elementary schooling information, 
family and professional networks, etc.  However, some of these data may not be available 
or reported in a standardized fashion and the hindrances we faced will remain. Additional 
lines of inquiry could examine fixed and variable compensation proportions, as well as the 
sensitivity of compensation packages, relative to board characteristics.  
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Number of different academic backgrounds of BOD members in a company-
year, such as business, law, technology, etc.  
Age Average age of the BOD members in a company-year. 
Busy 
Percentage of outside BOD members that hold five or more BOD seats in other 
companies. 
CEO-other 
Percentage of outside BOD members that are also identified as CEOs in other 
companies.  
Committees Number of BOD committees with 50% or more of outside members.  
Independent 
Percentage of independent members of the BOD. Only the BOD members 
identified as independents were counted.  
Outsider 
Percentage of outside effective BOD members. Outside BOD members are 
those that belong only to the BOD and not to senior management.  
SD of age Standard deviation of the age of the BOD members in a company-year.  
Size 
Number of effective BOD members for each company-year. Only members of 
the BOD, and not their substitutes were counted.  
Woman 
Percentage of female effective BOD members. Gender determination was 
made through their first names because there is no gender identification field.  
 




Sum of the total annual compensation of all members of the BOD divided by 
the total number of effective BOD members (size).  
AMC 
Sum of the total annual compensation of all members of senior management 
divided by the total number of senior managers.  
TBC Sum of the total annual compensation of all members of the BOD.  
TMC Sum of the total annual compensation of all members of senior management. 
 
Control variables:  
 
N2NM 
Null if the company is listed in the traditional or Level 1 segments of the 
Brazilian stock exchange; 1 otherwise, i. e., if listed in Level 2 or Novo Mercado 
(NM).  
PB 
Price-to-book ratio defined as the ratio between the market value and the book 
value for each company-year.  
ROA 
Return on assets defined as the ratio between earnings before interest and total 
assets for each company-year from the end of the year income statement and 
balance sheet.  
T1 
Percentage of direct ownership of the largest shareholder in the voting and 
non-voting equity capital in each company-year.  
TA 
Natural logarithm of total assets of each company-year from the annual 
balance sheet.  
 

